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Abstract
Using the case of the Indian manufacturing sector and exploiting plausibly exogenous
variation from Chinese imports, we provide causal evidence that higher import com-
petition increases the share of the formal enterprise employment. We find an increase
in the level of formal enterprise employment, driven by the high productivity firms,
and in contrast, a fall in the informal enterprise employment. This labor reallocation
is enabled by contract workers, who do not carry stringent firing costs. Our estimates
imply that Chinese import competition led to an increase in the share of formal sector
employment by 4.1 percentage points between 2000 and 2005. We calculate the labor
productivity gap between the formal and informal sector, adjusting for differences
in prices and worker characteristics and find them to be salient in explaining the
observed gap. Our preferred estimate of the productivity gap implies an increase in
labor productivity by 3.19% in response to Chinese import competition.
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1 Introduction
The presence of a large informal sector in developing countries hinders economic growth
by reducing aggregate productivity due to misallocation of resources (Hsieh and Klenow,
2009).1 Any reallocation of employment towards more productive formal sector firms,
therefore, can increase aggregate productivity and promote growth.2 Given that the firms
in developing countries are increasingly exposed to import competition, it is important
to study the role of import competition on the allocation of labor across the formal and
informal sectors. Import competition can increase formal employment as unproductive
informal firms exit, but can also decrease formal employment if unproductive formal firms
transition to the informal sector (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2021). Not surprisingly, the empirical
evidence on the effect of import competition on informality is mixed, with some studies
showing null or economically small positive effects on informality (Goldberg and Pavcnik,
2003; Paz, 2014), while others showing significant positive effects on informality (Dix-
Carneiro and Kovak, 2019).
Exploiting the meteoric rise of Chinese manufacturing imports, we provide new evidence
that higher import competition from China increased the share of employment in the
formal sector manufacturing enterprises in a large developing country, India.3 This was
driven both by a decline in informal enterprise employment and an increase in the level of
formal enterprise employment. Our findings suggest that import competition, by forcing
informal firms to exit, can reallocate resources toward more productive formal firms leading
to aggregate productivity gains in developing countries. An important contribution of our
study is to show that trade can induce formalization by increasing competition in the
domestic market, a result hitherto only observed in the context of export market access
(McCaig and Pavcnik, 2018 and Costa et al., 2016).
1A large share of informal sector also constrains growth by lowering the tax base and hindering fiscal
capacity (Besley and Persson, 2013; Levy, 2010)
2A variegated set of policy options have been considered to promote formalization and the growth of
small enterprises, including the lowering of registration costs or taxes for formal firms, providing capital
grants to small firms, and the careful dismantling of size-based policies to incentivise growth (De Mel et al.,
2013; McKenzie, 2017; Rocha et al., 2018).
3A large share of employment in India is concentrated in the informal sector. In 2005, the share of
informal workers in the manufacturing sector employment was approximately 80%(Asturias et al., 2019)
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Studying the impact of import competition on labor reallocation between the informal
and formal sector enterprises presents several challenges. First, comprehensive data on
informal enterprises are usually not available. India is the only country we are aware of
where nationally representative surveys of informal enterprises covering both urban and
rural areas, and using non-household sampling units are available.4 We exploit the avail-
ability of these enterprise data, and complement them with formal sector firm level data for
the years 2000-2001 and 2005-2006, to study the allocation of employment between these
sectors in this period. We categorize firms as formal or informal using a size (employment)
based objective criterion set by the Factories Act 1948.5
A second challenge lies in identifying the effects of import competition on employ-
ment, which is often riddled with simultaneity concerns related to unobserved demand and
technology shocks that affect both imports and employment. We exploit the differential
exposure of industries in India to Chinese imports to study the relationship between import
competition and formal share of employment.The increase in Chinese imports are plausibly
exogenous because they are primarily driven by the increase in manufacturing productiv-
ity in China due to its own internal reforms (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2013).6
The share of Chinese imports to overall imports to India stood at a remarkable 18 percent
in 2007. While Chinese import share to India rose by over 16 times between 1998-2007,
imports from other low- and middle, and high-income countries to India only doubled. To
address any remaining endogeneity concerns, we employ an instrumental variable strategy
that uses Chinese imports to a set of Latin American countries as an instrument for Chi-
nese imports into India (following Acemoglu et al., 2016).7 We control for alternative trade
4Brazil conducts informal enterprise surveys every five years, but these are restricted to urban areas.
The informal sector surveys of Mexico (ENAMIN) were conducted only in urban areas until 2005. Further,
both ENAMIN and Cameron’s Employment and Informal Sector Surveys use household as the sampling
unit to survey details on household-owned enterprises. On the contrary, India’s unorganized sector surveys
cover all regions (except some extremely remote areas), and use the Economic Census of India that provides
a comprehensive coverage of units undertaking any economic activity, as the sampling frame.
5Nataraj (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) similarly use an enterprise-based definition of infor-
mality.
6Among other things, these internal reforms enabled the setting up of special economic zones (Alder
et al., 2013), facilitated technology transfers through foreign direct investments (Autor et al., 2016) and
multinational activity (Naughton, 2006), and promoted the mass migration of workers from rural to urban
areas (Chen et al., 2010). Further, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 provided
an additional boost to its exports (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006).
7The Latin American countries that we use for constructing the instrumental variable are Argentina,
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channels and a rich set of fixed effects to control for unobservables.
A final challenge lies in quantifying the aggregate productivity changes due to reallo-
cation of labor across the two sectors. A well documented issue with calculating labor
productivity gap between the sectors using revenue data is that it captures differences in
prices, due to markup and demand shocks, in addition to underlying productivity differ-
ences across the two sectors (McCaig and Pavcnik, 2018). Since formal sector firms, on
average, charge higher prices compared to the informal sector, the observed productivity
gap between the two sectors is likely to be inflated. Another contribution of our study
is that we exploit the availability of unique data on physical production and sales for all
firm-products in the firm level surveys for both formal and informal sectors to adjust the
observed productivity gap for price differences across the sectors.
Our results imply that between 2000 and 2005, Chinese import competition led to an
increase in formal share of employment by 4.1 percentage points. This increase in formal
share of employment was driven by an increase in formal sector employment while the
informal sector contracted significantly resulting in net employment losses in the industry.
We evaluate the potential gains in aggregate labor productivity from this trade-induced
shift of workers across the two sectors employing standard development accounting methods
(Caselli, 2005). Our preferred estimate of labor productivity gap is 2.18, after adjusting
for differences in prices, human capital, hours worked between the formal and informal
sectors. Our calculations suggest that ignoring price differences leads to overestimation of
productivity gap by 70%. Using this measure of labor productivity gap, we estimate that
Chinese import competition led to an increase in aggregate labor productivity by 3.19%
relative to the baseline labor productivity.
This increase in formal sector employment in response to import competition is driven
by contract labor. Unlike the firm’s regular workers, contract workers are employed on
fixed term contracts through third party intermediaries and do not carry firing costs.8
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We choose these
countries as they are not major trade partners of India and thus, the possibility of alternative trade channels
contaminating our estimates is diminished.
8In India, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, imposes considerable firing costs for regular workers directly
employed by large formal firms (Besley and Burgess, 2004).
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We find that Chinese import competition led to an overall increase in contract labor by
10.1%. Overall, these results indicate that the institution of contract labor enable the
smooth reallocation of workers between the informal and formal sectors. These results
are consistent with studies that show that stringent firing costs imposed by Employment
Protection Laws (EPL) limit employment adjustment and hamper the worker reallocation
(Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012; Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; Kambourov, 2009), and
that contract or temporary workers enable smoother adjustment of workforce even in the
presence of strict firing laws, as documented in India (Chaurey, 2015; Saha et al., 2013)
and the United States (Autor, 2003). These results on contract labor are further consistent
with Bertrand et al. (2015) that demonstrate the role of contract labor in the growth of
the large formal sector manufacturing firms in India.
Overall, the results indicate that workers reallocated from the informal sector are pre-
dominantly absorbed as contract workers in the formal sector. Our estimates suggest that
reallocated workers experience a gain in wages of 0.3% relative to the baseline wage. While
these wage gains are modest, the reallocated workers also stand to gain legal protection
which is absent in informal enterprises. While informal enterprise workers do not enjoy
any legal protection, contract workers are covered under the Contract Labor Act 1970 that
provides several welfare amenities such as the minimum wage, timely wage payment, and
safety and amenities at workplace.
Institutions that increase the costs of operating in the formal sector lead to misallocation
in the form of a large informal sector (Boedo and Mukoyama, 2012; Hsieh and Klenow,
2009). We would expect import competition led reallocation to be more pronounced in
contexts where misallocation and informality is already high to begin with. In India,
informality is higher in states with stringent labor firing regulations and stronger union
presence. Indeed, we find that the overall increase in formal share of employment as a
result of Chinese import competition is primarily driven by states with more stringent
Employment Protection Laws (based on the classification in Besley and Burgess (2004))
and states with high level of unionization of workers. We also observe that formalization
transition in these states are, in turn, driven by contract labor. Our findings suggest that
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Chinese import competition could reduce misallocation through the reallocation of labor
from the informal to the formal sector, leading to aggregate productivity gains.
Our study contributes to the literature examining the relationship between trade and
informality. Our study relates to Dix-Carneiro et al. (2021) who study the role of trade
liberalization in a structural general equilibrium model through counterfactual simulations
and find that reduction in trade costs results in the exit of informal firms and a large decline
in informal employment in the import competing sector in Brazil. Our findings complement
these results and provide reduced form causal evidence that Chinese import competition
leads to an increase in the formal share of employment and aggregate productivity gains in
the import competing sector. Our study is also related to McCaig and Pavcnik (2018), who
find that export market access increases aggregate productivity by increasing the formal
share in employment. Complementing their findings, we provide the first empirical evidence
that import competition led formalization also leads to productivity gains from trade.
Our work also relates to empirical papers studying the effect of tariff liberalization
episodes on informality. Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019) and Paz (2014) study tariff liber-
alization in Brazil and find that tariff reductions lead to increase in informality. Goldberg
and Pavcnik (2003) find that tariff liberalization had a significant positive impact on infor-
mality in Colombia in the period preceding labor market reforms, while report no effects
on informality in Brazil. Cisneros-Acevedo (2019) finds that hiring of informal workers by
registered employers increased due to tariff liberalization in Peru. In contrast to these find-
ings, our results suggest that import competition reduces the share of employment in the
informal sector. Our focus on an enterprise-based definition of informality, combined with
detailed firm level data on formal and informal sector firms enables us to study reallocation
of workers across firms with differing underlying productivities and quantify the ensuing
productivity gains.
We also contribute to the growing literature on the effects of Chinese import competition
on employment (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2013, 2014; Bloom et al., 2016; Utar and
Ruiz, 2013).9 These studies document a significant negative impact of Chinese imports on
9Mansour et al. (2020) find that Chinese import competition leads to adverse employment consequences
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manufacturing employment. Consistent with these findings, we also document short term
employment losses in industries more exposed to import competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework.
Section 3 discusses the data sources. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5
presents and discusses the results and the robustness checks. Section 6 documents the in-
crease in aggregate productivity due to reallocation from informal to formal sector. Section
7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we briefly layout the potential mechanisms linking import competition to the
allocation of labor across the formal and informal sector in a developing country. Import
competition can lead to increase in formal share of employment due to exit of informal
firms (extensive margin) as well as due to increase in the employment ratio of formal and
informal sector firms (intensive margin).
An increase in imports to an industry reduces demand for firms, and this would dis-
proportionately reduce the profits of firms with higher marginal costs. Informal firms, on
average, have substantially lower productivity compared to formal sector firms (McCaig and
Pavcnik, 2018), either due to differences in underlying productivity (Melitz, 2003) or man-
agerial ability (Lucas Jr, 1978). Import competition would induce some low productivity
formal firms to transition to the informal sector, but it would also force some unproductive
informal firms to exit the industry as they are unable to earn enough profits to stay in the
market (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2021). Thus, the overall effect of import competition on infor-
mal employment can be positive or negative depending on the channel that dominates. In
a counterfactual analysis on the Brazilian economy, Dix-Carneiro et al. (2021) find that the
extensive margin of exit of informal firms dominates and a reduction in trade costs results
in a significant lowering of informal share of employment in the import competing sector.
It is important to note that we have implicitly assumed that the informal sector directly
for women workers in Peru.
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competes with Chinese imports. In India, there is abundant anecdotal evidence that the
informal sector directly competes with Chinese imports and it is negatively impacted by
Chinese import competition.10
In models with heterogeneous firms, monopolistic competition, and endogenous markup,
as in (Melitz, 2018), import competition can also lead to intensive margin reallocation
toward the more productive formal firms.11 High productivity firms, who also charge higher
markup, will reduce markup and hence prices as the price elasticity of demand increases in
response to increase in import competition. This leads to reallocation of output and labor
towards more productive formal firms.
Further, increased import competition can induce high productivity firms to increase
investments and employment (escape competition effect) while low productivity firms shrink
and are discouraged from investing (Schumpeterian effect) (Aghion et al., 2005).12 Import
competition could also induce formal firms to increase the demand for contract workers to
counter the bargaining power of permanent workers (Saha et al., 2013). This increase in
demand for workers by high productivity formal firms would increase the opportunity cost
of workers in the informal sector. If formal and informal firms compete in the labor market,
this would further reinforce the reallocation of workers towards the more productive formal
firms.
Our discussion above linking import competition to formal share of employment has
abstracted from mobility frictions that may restrict the movement of workers from informal
to the formal sector and would dampen the reallocation process. If these frictions are
salient, it would frustrate any attempt to empirically identify the reallocation effect of
import competition. Taken together, these mechanisms highlight the complex relationship
between import competition and labor allocation across the formal and informal sectors.
Whether import competition leads to an increase or decrease in formal share of employment
10See, for example, ASSOCHAM (2013a,b); Khan (2014); Roy (2013); Sathyanarayana (2014).
11There is empirical evidence that markups vary across firms within industries in India. De Loecker et al.
(2016) document considerable differences in markup across firms within industries in the manufacturing
sector in India.
12Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017), studying US firms, find that Chinese import competition leads to
increased investments and employment in firms with high market share while it reduces investments and
employment in laggard firms. Bloom et al. (2016) study European manufacturing firms and find that
Chinese import competition leads to reallocation of workers toward technologically more advanced firms.
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is ultimately an empirical question.
3 Data Sources and Measurement of Informality
3.1 Data Sources
Our primary source of data on informal firms is the quinquennial cross-sectional unorga-
nized sector enterprise (NSS) surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey Organiza-
tion (NSSO). For the formal sector, we use data for manufacturing plants from the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted by the Central Statistical Office (CSO), Government
of India.13 We use the ASI data in 2000-2001 and 2005-2006 to match with the years the
NSSO unorganized sector survey data are available. Henceforth, we refer to this combined
dataset as ASI-NSS. We observe information on the number of employees in both the NSS
and ASI establishment surveys. In addition, the ASI also reports information separately
on regular employment and contract employment.14
Further, both the NSS and ASI surveys are unique in that they capture detailed infor-
mation on physical production, units of measure, and sales for disaggregated product lines
produced by each firm.15 We also use the unit level panel ASI data with firm identifiers
from 1998-1999 to 2007-2008 to study outcomes within the formal sector firms over time.16
Our primary source of worker level data is the Employment-Unemployment survey (EUS
henceforth) conducted by the NSSO. This is a quinquennial cross-section survey and we
utilize data for two years, namely, 1999-2000 and 2004-2005. The survey reports data on
worker characteristics such as age, gender, education, martial status, residence location,
religion, and social group, and employer characteristics, such as, firm size and usage of
electricity.
13These surveys use the Economic Census–a complete enumeration of all entrepreneurial units in India–as
the sampling frame.
14Another important micro-level dataset on Indian firms is PROWESSS, which is published by the Centre
for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). However, unlike the ASI, PROWESS does not collect data on
contract workers and therefore may not be suitable to explore the changes in labor market.
15The product lines are classified according to the Standard Industrial Commodity Classification (AS-
ICC) classification.
161998 is the first year for which ASI is available with an establishment identifier.
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Our primary source of trade data at the industry level (NIC) is sourced from the UN-
COMTRADE database.17 From this database, we compiled data on Chinese imports to
India, and to a set of low- and middle-, and high-income countries. We also compiled total
imports to India from low- and middle-, and high-income (other than China and the IV
countries), and India’s export share to countries in the instrumental variable list.
To construct the import competition measure (described in Section 3), we also require
the baseline production data in India. For this, we used both formal sector output from
the ASI in the year 1994, and informal sector output from the survey of unorganized
manufacturing enterprises conducted by NSSO in the year 1995. We use data on input and
output tariffs from Ahsan and Mitra (2014) for the years between 1998 and 2003, and from
Chakraborty and Raveh (2018) for the years between 2004 and 2007.
We use data on labor institutions from two separate sources. First, we use a state
level measure of strength of regulations related to unions from a survey conducted by
Dougherty (2009). This measure captures state level differences in regulations related to
different aspects of union representation, namely, labor law reforms relating to restrictions
on the minimum number of workers in an union, recognition of unions as bargaining agents,
provisions for union formation in an enterprise, rules related to strikes, and code of conduct
between employers and unions. Second, we use the state level measure of labour regulation
by Besley and Burgess (2004), which reflects the state level differences in stringency in the
firing of regular workers under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA), the key employment
protection legislation in the Indian context.
3.2 Measuring Informality
India is one of the few countries to comprehensively collect periodic data on both formal
and informal sector employment through representative surveys of enterprises as well as
workers. Informality in India is closely linked to firm size and the government agencies
classify firms as formal/informal based on Factories Act, 1948. As per the Factories Act,
17Industries are classified as per the National Industries Classification (NIC) in both the EUS as well as
USE-ASI surveys.
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1948, any factory using power and employing 10 or more workers, and if not using power
and employing 20 or more workers is deemed to be registered in the formal sector.
We use enterprise level ASI-NSS data to measure formal share of employment in each
industry. The NSS and the ASI surveys are nationally representative surveys of unorganized
and formal sector enterprises, respectively. This classification of formal and informal is
made by the government based on firm-size and registration status, and accurately reflects
the formal-informal composition in the economy. We aggregate employment from ASI-NSS
at the state-industry and at the industry level, and define worker-share in the formal sector
in each aggregated unit as the share of workers in the ASI to total number of workers in
all firms in that unit. We also use the information on workers’ employer details from the
EUS, such as the number of workers and the use of electricity, to classify workers as formal
and informal.18
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for worker characteristics from the EUS in Panel
A and firm characteristics from ASI-NSS in Panel B. Formal workers (columns 1-3) are on
average better educated, are more likely to work in urban areas, and are less likely to be
females and from the disadvantages social groups and minorities, as compared to informal
workers (columns 4-6). Formal firms (columns 1-3) on average have much higher sales,
employ more workers, and pay much higher wages compared to informal firms (columns
4-6).
4 Empirical Approach and Identification
4.1 Chinese Import Competition
The steep rise in Chinese imports through the 1990s and 2000s were primarily driven by
China’s internal reforms leading to productivity gains, and China’s accession to the WTO
18Since some factories below these employment thresholds are also registered, we reclassify workers
employed in such enterprises as formal sector workers. We utilize responses on a firms’ registration status,
as reported by the workers, to do this reclassification. Specifically, we consider a firm below the size-
threshold to be a formal enterprise if the firm is a state-owned factory, a public/private limited company,
or a cooperative. A total of 516 workers get reclassified to the formal sector, which forms about 1% of
the main sample. Not surprisingly, our results are qualitatively similar without this reclassification and
excluding these workers from the estimation sample.
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in 2001. Our main identification strategy relies on exploiting across industry variation in
exposure to Chinese imports to study their effect on share of employment in formal firms.
Towards this end, we obtain a measure of Chinese import penetration in an industry j at





where MChinajt is the total imports of Chinese goods in industry j at time t; Yj,94, Mj,94
and Xj,94 refer to production, total imports, and total exports for industry j in India
in 1994. By normalizing Chinese imports to India over absorption (domestic production
plus imports less exports) before the start of our study period, our measure captures the
differential increase in Chinese imports across industries based on the initial size of an
industry in the domestic market.
There are, however, several reasons why an ordinary least squares regression of employ-
ment on import competition could produce biased estimates. For example, industry level
demand shocks that drive Chinese imports could also simultaneously influence employment,
or labor saving or displacing technologies that may drive imports could also be correlated
with domestic employment. We use an instrumental variable to address these endogeneity
concerns. Specifically, we instrument Chinese imports to India (given by equation 1) by
Chinese imports to a set of countries, following Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al.





whereMOthersjt refers to Chinese imports to industry j in time t in a set of Latin American
countries, namely Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.19 The instrument isolates the variation in Chinese imports that
is only due to supply side shocks from China. Chinese imports to the instrument-country
list are expected to be strongly correlated with Chinese imports to India if the basket of
19While tariffs have been used as instrumental variables for imports in many contexts, in India, tariffs
are not exogenous post 1996 (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011).
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goods exported from China to India and these countries are similar, and if these countries
experienced similar rise in Chinese exports. This assumption is testable.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of Chinese import share from 1998 to 2007 for India and
various country groups. The rise in the Chinese import share was very similar for India
and the instrument-countries. Further, the choice of Latin American countries ensures
that the exclusion criterion is likely to be satisfied, as these countries are not major trade
partners with India, and thus the correlation between Chinese imports to these countries
and India is solely due to the supply side component of Chinese imports arising from gains in
manufacturing productivity for Chinese firms. All our empirical specifications also control
for fixed effects at the state-year, industry(3-digit)-year, and state-(4-digit)industry- levels
to control for unobservables.
We further take into account alternative trade channels (varying at the same level as
our import competition measure) that could influence employment, and that are poten-
tially correlated with Chinese imports. We control for Chinese imports in inputs to an
industry to account for the confounding effect from access to potentially cheaper Chinese
inputs. Further, concurrent changes in trade policy may be correlated with Chinese im-
ports to India, which is addressed by controlling for industry level output and input tariffs.
Another concern is that Chinese imports to India may be correlated with imports from
other countries. To address this, we control for import penetration in India from low- and
middle-, and high-income countries in all specifications. Further, Chinese imports to India
may also be correlated with Chinese imports into other countries, and our estimates may
capture the effect of increased competition from China in destination markets for Indian
exporters. To address this, we control for Chinese import share in low- and middle-, and
high-income countries, excluding the set of IV countries. Finally, we control for India’s
exports to the IV countries to control for the direct effect of Chinese import competition
for Indian exporters in these countries.20
20We discuss the construction of these variables in Appendix A.
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4.2 Decomposition of Overall Change in Formal Share in Em-
ployment
Since we examine within industry changes in the share of formal enterprise employment as
a response to Chinese import competition, it is important to confirm that across-industry
changes in employment is not a major contributor to overall changes in industry employ-
ment. We start by analyzing whether the changes in formal share in our study period is
driven by industries with high/low formal share increasing their employment share in manu-
facturing (between), or due to changes in formal share with the industry (within). For this,
we decompose the overall change in formal enterprise share in employment, ∆FW , between





(0.5 ∗ (sjt + sjt−1))∆fwjt +
∑
j
(0.5 ∗ (fwjt + fwjt−1))∆sjt (3)
where fwjt denotes formal share in employment for industry j in year t, and sjt denotes
employment share of industry j in total employment in manufacturing. We aggregate
employment at the industry level, using the ASI-NSS data, to conduct this analysis. The
first term captures the change in formal share in employment due to changes in formal sector
employment across firms within an industry whereas the second term captures movement
of formal workers across industries. Table 2 reports the decomposition between 2000-2001
and 2005-2006 using the firm level surveys. We find that change in overall formal share in
employment is predominantly driven by within-industry change (column 2) and that the
magnitude of the between-industry effect is relatively small (column 3). We obtain similar
results if we decompose the share of contract workers and the share of regular workers.
The relationship between import competition and formal share in employment we explore
in this paper also similarly highlights within-industry changes in response to increased
import competition from China. Next, we turn to a more rigorous examination of the link
between Chinese import competition and formalization in our empirical analysis.
13
5 Results
To examine the relationship between Chinese import competition and formal share of em-
ployment, we use both enterprise surveys (ASI-NSS) in Section 5.1 and worker surveys
(EUS) in Section 5.2. We test for heterogeneity based on labor institutions in Section 5.3.
Having established the positive effect of Chinese imports on formal share of employment, we
focus on the formal sector, and examine within-firm employment changes and heterogeneity
in responses based on initial productivity (Section 5.4).
5.1 Aggregate Changes in Formal Employment
We employ the ASI-NSS data to study the relationship between Chinese import competition




jt−1 + Zjt−1ψ + αj(3)t + αst + αjs + νjst (4)
where Y is either the share of formal sector employment in total employment or (log
of) total, informal, formal, formal-regular and formal-contract employment. s denotes
a state, and j denotes an industry defined at the 4-digit level (NIC 2004). Our main
explanatory variable is the industry level (at 4-digit) import penetration ratio for Chinese
imports, IMPChinajt−1 .
21 Zjt−1 is a vector of variables capturing alternative trade channels
(described in Section 4). We control for state × industry (αjs), state × year (αst), and
three-digit industry × year (αj(3)t) fixed effects to control for unobservables. We cluster
robust standard errors at the industry level which is the level of variation of our treatment
variable. Regressions are weighted by the state-industry employment in the initial year,
2000–2001.22
21We use a lagged measure of Chinese import penetration to alleviate endogeneity concerns related to an-
ticipatory employment responses to Chinese import competition, and to ensure that we study employment
responses to past changes in import competition.
22Weights could be: (1) initial total employment if the outcome is share of formal employment or total
employment; (2) initial informal employment if the outcome is informal employment, and (3) initial formal
employment if the outcome is either total formal, regular, or contract employment.
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Table 3 reports the results. Panel A and B report results from OLS and IV estimation
of the specification, respectively. The first stage F statistics suggest a strong first stage
relationship between our IV and the endogenous variable. In column (1), the coefficient
on IMP chinajt−1 is positive and significant, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in
Chinese import competition leads to an increase in formal share of employment by 1.55
percentage points at the state-industry level. The coefficient is statistically significant in
the IV regression.23
In columns (2)–(4), we document the effect of Chinese import competition on the (log
of) overall employment, informal, and formal sector employment, respectively. The results
indicate that a one percentage point increase in Chinese import competition leads to a
decline in overall employment by 7.96%, decline in informal employment by 15.75%, and an
increase in formal sector employment by 4.39%. Thus, Chinese import competition induces
a large decline in informal sector employment while increasing formal sector employment,
leading to an increase in formal share in employment. Taken together, these results suggest
that Chinese import competition led to a reallocation of employment from the informal to
the formal sector. We further disaggregate formal sector employment into regular (column
5) and contract workers (column 6) to identify the source of increase in formal sector
employment observed in column (4). The rise in formal employment is largely driven by
contract labor. A one percentage point increase in Chinese import competition leads to an
increase in regular employment by 3.53% and contract employment by 10.59%.24
As discussed earlier in Section 2, Chinese import competition may also lead to increase
in the informality in the exposed industries as formal firms and workers transition to the
informal sector (Dix-Carneiro et al., 2021; Dix-Carneiro and Kovak, 2019). Further, for-
mal firms may subcontract manufacturing activities to the informal sector to save cost
Chakraborty and Sundaram (2020). Our findings suggests that while these mechanisms
may be present, they are dominated by the reallocation of activity from the informal to
the formal sector as unproductive informal firms exit in response to greater competition.
23Our results are robust to clustering at the broader NIC 3-digit industry as well as controlling for an
industry’s exposure to de-reservation of SSI. Results are reported in Table B1 (Appendix B).
24We obtain qualitatively similar results if we estimate variants of Equation 4 at the industry level,
rather than at the state-industry level. We report these results in Table B2 (Appendix B).
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Table B3 reports results from estimating variants of Equation (4) for number of factories
and sales as outcome variables. We find that there was net exit from the informal sector
(column 1) and net entry into the formal sector (column 2). Similarly, columns (3) and
(4) suggest that informal sector sales declined and there was no effect on sales of formal
sector.25
5.2 Worker Transitions to Formal Sector
Next, using the EUS data, we estimate the effect of Chinese import competition on the
probability of a worker being employed in the formal sector:
formalijst = β1IMP
China
jt−1 + Xijstδ + Zjt−1ψ + αj(3)t + αst + αjs + νijst (5)
where i denotes a worker and formalijst, our outcome variable of interest, is an indicator
variable which is equal to 1 if a worker is employed in the formal sector. Xijst is a vector of
worker characteristics that includes age, indicators for gender, education, marital status,
religious minority, disadvantaged social groups, and residence in rural areas.26. We cluster
robust standard errors at the industry level. Regressions are weighted using sample weights
from the survey.
Table 4 reports the results from Equation (5) and its variants from OLS (columns
1-3) and IV (columns 4-6) estimations. We present the specification excluding (columns
1 and 4) and including controls for worker characteristics (columns 2 and 5), and their
interaction with an indicator variable for the year 2004–2005 to control for changes in
25Import competition could also lead to increase in employment in the non-manufacturing sectors of the
economy if the unemployed manufacturing workers get absorbed by these sectors. Following Autor et al.
(2013), we calculate the exposure of each district to Chinese import competition. We use EUS survey
to calculate district level employment in manufacturing, agriculture and mining, and services. Table B4
reports the result from estimating a district level regression of Chinese import competition on employment
outcomes. The effect of Chinese import competition on overall employment is negative but imprecisely
estimated. Further, districts more exposed to Chinese import competition experience a large decline
in manufacturing employment consistent with our results in Table 3. We find no significant effect on
employment in the agriculture and mining, and services sectors.
26Educational categories include primary and below, below secondary, and secondary and higher edu-
cation. Social group categories in India include the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward
Castes, and Other Castes.
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worker characteristics between the two sample rounds (columns 3 and 6).27 The first-stage
F-statistics for the IV estimates in columns (4)-(6) imply a strong relationship between
our instrument and IMPChinajt−1 . The coefficient on IMP
China
jt−1 is positive and significant in
all columns suggesting that increase in Chinese import competition significantly increases
the probability of being employed in a formal enterprise. The coefficient in our preferred
specification in column (6) implies that a one percentage point change in Chinese import
competition leads to an increase in the probability of being employed in a formal enterprise
by 0.47 percentage points. For an industry that experiences a change in IMP equivalent
to the average change between the two survey rounds, 0.05, our coefficient translates to an
overall increase in formal sector employment by 2.35 percentage points.
Next, we report robustness checks for the main results in Table B5 (Appendix B).
In column (1), we find that our results are robust to clustering the standard errors at a
more aggregated industry level (NIC 3-digit). Martin et al. (2017) find higher employment
growth in the formal sector is in response to de-reservation of SSI products. If de-reservation
of SSI products is systematically related to Chinese imports, this could lead to spurious
correlation between increase in Chinese imports and formal employment. Column (2)
controls for de-reservation exposure of each industry and the coefficient remains statistically
significant with very similar magnitudes compared to the baseline results.28 Finally, we
show robustness to an alternative definition of informality. Recall that we reclassified
workers as formal if they report working for a firm that is registered even if they are
deemed to be working in an informal firm based on the size threshold. In column (3), we
reclassify these workers as informal, and find that our results continue to be robust. In
column (4), we drop these reclassified workers from the estimation sample and our results
continue to remain robust. Thus, the increase in the aggregate level results from enterprise
surveys is corroborated by the increase in the probability of formal sector employment
observed in the worker level surveys. It is encouraging that our results are qualitatively
consistent across two independent data sources.
27We find positive and significant effects when we estimate specification in column (3) using a Probit
model (results available on request).
28We use data on product level de-reservation from Martin et al. (2017) and construct an indicator
variable equal to 1 if at least one product is dereserved in that industry.
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The overall effects documented above could mask considerable heterogeneity based on
worker characteristics, because workers may have different adjustment costs based on de-
mographic characteristics (Dix-Carneiro, 2014), and because firms may have differential
demand for workers based on these characteristics in response to Chinese import competi-
tion. Next, we test for worker heterogeneity based on age, education, and location.
Table B6 (Appendix B) shows that the overall results are primarily driven by expe-
rienced workers between 30 and 45 years of age (column 2) while the effect is weaker and
statistically significant at the 10% level for workers below 30 years of age (column 1) and
is insignificant for older workers (column 3). These findings are consistent with a larger
mobility costs for older compared to younger workers. Also, informal sector specific skills
may not be perfectly transferable to the formal sector. On the other hand, we do not find
any significant differences in transition to the formal sector based on education levels. The
magnitude of the coefficients are larger for workers with education lower than secondary
level (columns 1 and 2) compared to workers who have completed secondary education or
higher (column 3).29 Lastly, we find that the overall effects are driven by workers in urban
areas (column 8) with no significant effect on rural workers (column 7).30
5.3 Heterogeneity Based on Institutions
We expect the effect of Chinese import competition on transition of informal workers to
the formal sector to be higher in settings where misallocation of workers across the two
sectors is high to begin with. Labor market imperfections, such as EPLs, are often cited
as a potential reason for the presence of informality (Besley and Burgess, 2004). However,
the reallocation of workers to the formal sectors will be hindered in precisely these same
settings as high firing costs would deter formal firms to absorb new workers (Hopenhayn
29These differences are not statistically significant. The higher magnitudes for workers with lower levels
of education is suggestive of increase in demand for low skilled workers by formal firms in response to
Chinese import competition. This finding is also consistent with the observed increase in contract workers,
who are relatively low skilled compared to the regular workers, in the formal sector. We discuss these
results in Section 5.1.
30A potential explanation of the null effects for rural workers may be that firms in rural areas are shielded
from import competition due to relatively higher trade costs of reaching rural markets for imported Chinese
goods.
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and Rogerson (1993); Kambourov (2009); Boedo and Mukoyama (2012)). Thus, in settings
with high firing costs for formal firms, presence of alternative institutions, like contract
labor, are needed to facilitate reallocation of workers to the formal sector.
In India, two sets of labor institutions, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (IDA) and
high unionization, lead to higher labor adjustment costs for large formal firms.31 During
our study period, however, the institution of contract workers was already well established
in India and had considerably relaxed these constraints for the large formal firms. Firms
can hire contract workers under the Contract Labor Act 1970, and these workers are not
under the ambit of the IDA, and are typically not a part of firm level unions. Indeed, in a
period when contract workers were not prevalent, Adhvaryu et al. (2013) find that firms in
states with pro-labor institutions do not adjust employment in response to rainfall shocks.
On the other hand, Chaurey (2015) finds an increase in employment for formal firms driven
by contract employment in response to rainfall shocks between 1998-2007.
We test for heterogeneous impacts based on labor institutions in India. First, we con-
sider the IDA, that stipulates labor firing restrictions for large firms, but not for small
firms.32 Several states have amended the IDA, leading to variation in the level of strin-
gency with which it is applicable. We use a simple bifurcation of states into pro-worker
and pro-employer categories based on the codification of the amendments to the IDA by
Besley and Burgess (2004).33 Second, a strong union presence could potentially limit the
size of the formal sector. We use the index by Dougherty (2009) of state level unionization
rates, and classify states into high and low union states based on the median value of the
index.
31Indeed, the pro-worker states and high unionization states have a higher share of informality compared
to other states.
32Two aspects of the Industrial Disputes Act , 1947, are relevant. Under section V-A, in establishments
with 50 or more workers, a worker who is retrenched could claim compensation for wages for 15 days for
each year of service. If worker is laid-off, they must be provided half of their basic wage and a dearness
allowance for each day they are laid off, for a maximum of 45 days. Establishments with 100 or more
workers are covered under Section V-B, and requires firms to obtain government permission to lay-off or
retrench even a single worker. Prior notification with the government is required if an establishment plans
to close down (sixty days for Section V-A or ninety days for Section V-B).
33Besley and Burgess (2004) exploited state level amendments to the IDA to generate state level scores
indicating the stringency of these laws. The larger the value, the higher the firing costs and more “pro-
worker” the state is. On the other extreme, negative values indicate low firing costs and a “pro-employer”
regime. Zero indicates neutrality. States with a positive score are classified as “pro-worker” states.
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We estimate Equations (5) and (4) separately for pro-worker and pro-employer states,
and low and high unionization states. Results presented in Table 5 suggest that Chinese
import competition differentially increases the probability of a worker being employed in
a formal enterprise in high unionization (column 1) and pro-worker states (column 3),
compared to low unionization (column 2) and pro-employer states (column 4). The results
from firm surveys at the state-industry level in columns (5)-(8) corroborate the findings from
the worker surveys in columns (1)-(4). Finally, as hypothesized, columns (9)-(12) provide
strong evidence that the increase in the share of contract employment in total employment
is also driven by firms in high unionization (column 9) and pro-worker (column 11) states.
5.4 Within-Firm Employment in the Formal Sector
To further examine the mechanism behind increase in formal sector employment, we exploit
the availability of the establishment level panel dataset from the ASI between 1998-1999
and 2007-2008. This enables us to document the within firm changes in overall employment




j,t−1 + Zjt−1ψ + αi + αj(3)t + αst + νijst (6)
where i denotes a firm. Yijst, the outcome variable, could denotes either (log of) total
workers, regular workers, contract workers, or the contract worker ratio. In addition to the
trade channels and fixed effects in Equation (4), we include firm fixed effects, αi, to control
for time invariant firm level characteristics. Regressions are weighted using sample weights
from the ASI.
Columns (1)-(4) and (5)-(8) of Table 6 report results from OLS and IV estimations,
respectively. From our preferred IV specification in column (5), the coefficient on IMP
is positive and significant suggesting that Chinese import competition also leads to an
increase in firm level employment on average among formal sector firms. The effect on
regular workers is negative, but statistically insignificant in the IV specification in column
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(6). The positive and significant coefficient in column (7) (contract workers) and column
(8) (contract worker ratio) provides strong evidence that the overall increase in within firm
employment in the formal sector is driven primarily by the increase in contract employment.
The IV coefficients imply that for a one percentage point increase in Chinese import com-
petition, there was an increase in within-firm employment in the formal sector by 0.11%,
contract workers by 0.31%, and contract share in employment by 0.048 percentage points.
Thus, our within firm level results mirror our earlier results, in Section 5.1, documenting
an increase in aggregate employment, primarily through contract employment.
To identify the formal sector firms that expand employment in response to Chinese
import competition, we estimate heterogeneous impacts based on initial productivity using








jt−1 ×Qrk) + Zjt−1ψ
+ αi + αj(3)t + αst + αsj + νijst (7)
This specification is the same as Equation (6), but with additional interaction terms
between IMP chinajt−1 and indicator variables for the quartile the firm belongs to in the initial
productivity distribution (Qrk). Productivity is computed using total factor productivity
(TFP), and is captured in the first year in which firm appears in the data. We estimate the
TFP using the methodology proposed by Ackerberg et al. (2015). Regressions are weighted
using sample weights from the ASI.
Results are presented in Table 7. Column (1) indicates that there is a decline in
employment in the lowest quartile although it is imprecisely estimated, and a differential
increase in employment among firms in higher quartiles compared to firms in the lowest
quartile. We observe similar results for regular (column 2), contract (column 3), and
contract worker ratio (column 4). Thus, the overall increase in formal employment, driven
by contract labor, documented in Table 3 is led by the high productivity formal firms.
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6 Reallocation and Aggregate Labor Productivity
To quantify the aggregate labor productivity gains from Chinese import competition, we
use information on the share of workers that are reallocated from informal to formal sector
(Sf ) and the increase in labor productivity for a worker moving from informal to formal
sector (∆ωf ). The labor productivity gain from reallocation can then be computed as ∆ω =
Sf∆ωf . The calculation of Sf is straightforward and we compute it using the coefficient (β)
on IMP chinajt−1 in Table 3. Specifically, Sf =
∑
sjmsj(β×∆IMP ), where msj is each state-
industry’s share in overall manufacturing employment and ∆IMP is the industry level
change in Chinese import competition between 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. The estimates
imply an overall change in formal share of employment by 4.1 percentage points. Obtaining
accurate estimates of labor productivity gap between formal and informal sector, however, is
more challenging due to measurement issues and unobserved heterogeneity in characteristics
of the two sectors. Below, we describe the procedure to calculate the labor productivity
gap between the two sectors and discuss potential issues associated with these calculations
and how we address them.
6.1 Development Accounting Framework
We consider an industry comprised of two types of firms, formal and informal, that differ
in their total factor productivity (TFP). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function
with labor and capital as factor inputs, competitive markets, and homogeneous labor, it
can be shown that the ratio of marginal product of labor between the two sectors equals
the wage ratio as well as the ratio of the average product of labor.34 Formally, let the




s , where Ys is real output,
Ks and Ls are capital and labor inputs, respectively, As denotes the TFP, and αs is the
output elasticity with respect to capital. Under the assumption of perfect competition and
homogeneous labor in the two sectors, the wages (w) equal the marginal revenue product
of labor (MRPL) which in turn is equal to the product of output elasticity with respect to
34These assumptions are standard in the development accounting framework (Caselli, 2005)
22
labor and the average revenue product of labor (ARPL).
ws = MRPLs = (1 − αs)ARPLs
Assuming that the output elasticity of labor, 1 − α, is same across the two sectors, we can










where f and i denote the formal and informal sector, respectively.
Thus, the labor productivity gap between formal and informal sector can be calculated
using revenue per worker or wages.35 However, using the above framework entails strong
assumptions and there are several issues with the above approach. First, the ARPL gap as
measured by revenue per unit labor would also capture price differences arising from markup
and demand shocks across the two sectors. To address this, one needs to observe firm
level prices which is rarely observed in the data, especially for the informal sector. Second,
worker characteristics may be significantly different for workers across the two sectors which
would contaminate the measure of productivity gap. Thirdly, the estimates may suffer from
measurement issues in output as well as inputs. Fourth, the output elasticity with respect
to labor may be significantly different across the two sectors. In the following section,
we document the unadjusted labor productivity gap using Equation (8) and sequentially
adjust the productivity gap to address each of the issues discussed above.
6.2 Labor Productivity Gap
We observe wages, number of workers, and revenue in our firm level datasets for both
the informal and formal sectors, and hence are able to calculate the productivity gap using
both wages and revenue per worker using Equation (8).36 Table 8 reports the productivity
35McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) use both wages and revenue per worker to measure productivity gap
between the household and enterprise sector in Vietnam. Gollin et al. (2014) use revenue per worker,
while Vollrath (2014) use the wage gap to measure productivity differences between the agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors.
36Wages are calculated as total wages per worker paid by firms in a given year.
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gap results based on revenue per worker in column (1) and wages in column (2). In the
first row, we report the unadjusted raw gap in labor productivity between the formal and
informal sector. The gap is well above one in both columns, suggesting potentially large
productivity gains from reallocation of workers to the formal sector. The average revenue
per worker is almost 11 times higher in formal sector compared to the informal sector,
while this ratio is only 3.12 with wages. This larger gap in average revenue product of
labor compared to wages is consistent with the literature (McCaig and Pavcnik, 2018;
Nataraj, 2011). However, as discussed earlier in Section 6.1, this raw productivity gap may
be contaminated with measurement error and heterogeneity across the two sectors in the
output and input characteristics. Next, we discuss the main factors that may be driving
the large observed productivity gap and how we address these concerns in our calculations.
Differences in Hours Worked : We adjust the productivity gap for differences in the
average number of hours worked across the two sector. The number of hours worked may
not be proportional to the number of workers due to two reasons. First, a lot of informal
firms do not operate for the whole year and this would lead to under estimation of actual
productivity in the informal sector. Second, informal workers, on average, have lower
working hours compared to their formal counterpart. We use information on the number of
months in operation and average hours worked per day for informal firms, and number of
working days and employment reported by the formal firms to adjust the raw productivity
gap.37 A detailed description of the adjustment calculations is provided in the Appendix
Section C – C0.2. This adjustment lowers the productivity gap to 5.09 and wage gap to
1.45 and is reported in row (2).
Human Capital Differences : Another concern with our measured productivity gap is
that we may be capturing differences in human capital between the two sectors. Following
Gollin et al. (2014), we adjust for human capital differences in the two sectors using data
on the level of education reported in the NSSO employment-unemployment surveys. The
adjustment procedure is described in Appendix Section C – C0.3. This adjustment
37This information is available only in the 2005 round of the ASI-NSS surveys. By utilizing this data to
correct for differences in hours worked across the two sectors in the 2000 ASI-NSS round, we assume that
average number of hours worked across the two sectors do not change significantly between the two survey
rounds.
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reduces the revenue productivity gap in column (1) to 4.21, and wage gap in column (2) to
1.21. Thus, differences in hours worked and human capital across the two sectors explain
a significant part of the unadjusted labor productivity gap (72.2%) and wage gap (96.7%).
A remaining concern is that the large observed labor productivity gap and wage gap
between the sectors (Table 8) is due to other unobserved worker characteristics, besides
the years of education and number of hours worked. If this is the case, the productivity
and wage gap may be overestimated. To account for heterogeneity in worker character-
istics other than hours worked and human capital, we use the EUS survey (worker level)
and estimate Mincerian regressions of log wages on an indicator variable for formal sector
employment, and worker characteristics such as years of education, location, and socio-
demographic characteristics. We also include industry and state fixed effects to control for
industry and state specific unobservables that are correlated with both formal employment
and wages. The coefficient on the indicator variable gives us the wage premium associated
with working in the formal sector.
Table B7 reports the results. In column (1), without controlling for worker character-
istics, we find that there is a 31.4% wage premium for formal sector workers as compared
to a wage premium of 22.1% in column (3) which controls for education level of workers.
The wage premium further drops to 17.4% for formal sector workers compared to those
in the informal sector in the specification including all worker characteristics (column 7).
This suggest that there is a significant wage premium for formal sector workers even after
controlling for levels of education and other worker characteristics.
Differences in Prices : A well documented issue with measuring productivity from rev-
enue data is that the productivity measure will capture the effect of prices, due to markup
differences and demand shocks, in addition to the actual labor productivity (McCaig and
Pavcnik, 2018).38 Accounting for differences in prices is typically not feasible due to un-
availability of data on physical production in addition to revenue. This information is
rarely available even for formal sector firms. The firm level surveys in India are unique in
that they capture detailed production data for both formal and informal firms. We directly
38See De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and De Loecker et al. (2016) for a discussion of issues with
estimation of productivity from revenue data.
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observe the quantity manufactured, units of production, and revenues for each product
produced by the firm.39 This enables us to adjust for the differences in prices across the
informal and formal sector. We are not aware of any other dataset that documents physical
production for a representative sample of informal firms.
We adjust for price differences by computing firm level prices. First, we calculate the
firm-product level prices (unit values) as sales divided by physical quantity for each firm-
product. We compute the firm level price index as sales-share weighted sum of firm product
level prices. Next, we calculate the firm level real output by deflating nominal revenue by
firm level prices. We compare the revenue productivity gap from nominal revenue to that
from real revenue per worker gap and estimate the adjustment factor to be 1.73. We
provide detailed explanation of the procedure employed to correct for price differences in
Appendix Section C – C0.4.40
We adjust the productivity gap for differences in prices using the correction factor of
1.73 and the productivity gap drops to 2.18 in column (1) of Table 8. Thus, differences in
prices explain a significant part of the observed revenue productivity gap across the formal
and informal sector and failure to correct for price differences would lead to significant over-
estimation of potential labor productivity gains from reallocation. The estimates suggest
that differences in prices account for 57% of the revenue productivity gap.
Measurement Error in Output : Another issue with the estimated productivity gap is
that it may be driven by measurement errors in output. We account for the under-reporting
of revenues in the informal sector, and following De Mel et al. (2009), assume that revenues
were 30% higher than reported in the informal sector, and adjust our productivity gap in
39This information is available only in the 2005 round of the ASI-NSS surveys. By utilizing this data for
correcting price differences across the two sectors in the 2000 ASI-NSS round requires the assumption that
average price differences across the two sectors do not change significantly between the two survey rounds.
40Alternatively, we also utilize the availability of information on physical quantities at the firm product
level and calculate the physical quantity per worker for both sectors. We allocate workers to each firm-
product in proportion to the revenue share of the firm product in total firm revenues. Then we take the
ratio of revenue per worker gap to quantity per worker gap in each product category to arrive at the
adjustment factor. Note that we need quantity to be reported in the same units to be able to perform this
calculation. Thus, this calculation is based on a subset of 1600 product lines for which both formal and
informal sector datasets report quantities in the same units. We take a sales share weighted sum of the
product level adjustment factor and arrive at the overall adjustment factor for differences in prices. The
calculations suggest an adjustment factor of 1.67. Thus, we find similar effects of prices in explaining the
revenue productivity gap using both methods.
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column (1) to 1.53.
Differences in Output Elasticity of Labor : A remaining concern is that there may be
differences in the output elasticity between the formal and the informal sectors. Following
Fernandes and Paunov (2009), we assume that the output elasticity of labor in the formal
and informal sectors are 0.65 and 0.8, respectively. We adjust the productivity gap by a
factor of 1.23 and this adjustments reduces the gap in column (1) to 1.24.
6.3 Productivity Gains from Chinese Import Competition
We estimate the aggregate productivity gains, relative to the baseline average labor pro-
ductivity in the manufacturing sector, from reallocation in response to Chinese import
competition using the formula below:
∆ω =
Sf (ARPLgap − 1)ARPLi
(1 − si)ARPLf + siARPLi
(9)
where ARPLgap denotes the productivity gap between the two sectors, ARPL denotes
the average labor productivity in either the informal or formal sector,, and si is the share
of hours for informal sector in total hours worked. All these variables are defined in the
2000 ASI-NSS survey round.
We report productivity gains from three estimates of labor productivity gap in Table
8. The productivity gap in row (2), which adjusts for hours worked and human capital dif-
ferences, implies an aggregate productivity increase of 5.13% due to reallocation of workers
to the formal sector in response to increased Chinese import competition. Using estimates
in row (3) that additionally control for price differences implies an aggregate productivity
gain of 3.19%. It is clear from these calculations that failure to correct for price differences
greatly overestimates the overall productivity gains due to reallocation. We treat this esti-
mate of 3.19% as the upper bound for productivity gains from Chinese import competition.
Finally, we use estimates from row (5) that additionally correct for measurement error and
differences in output elasticity of labor across the two sectors which implies an aggregate
productivity gain of 0.89% (lower bound). Using a similar formula as Equation (9) for
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wages, our estimates suggest a modest gain in wages of 0.3% for workers transitioning to
the formal sector (based on row (2) of column (2) in Table 8).
7 Conclusion
Extant literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between import competition
and informality. In this paper, we show that higher Chinese import competition increases
the employment share in the formal sector in India. The rise in formal sector employment
is driven by contract worker employment in more productive formal firms. In contrast, in-
formal sector employment shrinks in response to Chinese import competition. By inducing
reallocation of workers from the informal to the formal sector, Chinese import competition
leads to aggregate labor productivity gains in the industry.
While we document an increase in the aggregate share of formal employment in response
to Chinese import competition, disentangling the strengths of the extensive and intensive
margins is not feasible due to data constraints. Further, our findings also suggest that the
observed productivity gap between the formal and informal sector is considerably inflated
and much of the gap is accounted for by differences in human capital, hours worked, and
prices across the two sectors. Identifying the role of extensive and intensive margin adjust-
ments in response to import competition, and accurately capturing the productivity gap
between the informal and formal sectors remains a fruitful area for future research.
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Chinese import share in IV countries
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Table 2: Decomposition of Change in Employment
Shares Between 2000-2001 and 2005-2006
(1) (2) (3)
Total Within Between
Formal Share in Employment 0.0294 0.0248 0.0046
Contract Share in Employment 0.0197 0.0175 0.0022
Regular Share in Employment 0.0098 0.0073 0.0024
Notes: The table reports sectoral decomposition of changes in the share
of employment of formal workers, contract workers, and regular workers
in total employment between 2000-2001 and 2005-2006 using the Annual
Survey of Industries, and NSSO’s unorganized sector surveys.
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Table 3: Chinese Import Competition and Employment: State-Year
Level Analysis
Share in Log Employment
total employment Total Informal Formal
Formal Total Regular Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 1.222 -6.972* -14.17** 4.605** 3.335* 10.63***
(0.778) (3.826) (6.437) (1.969) (1.799) (3.584)
Panel B: IV
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 1.546** -7.962* -15.75** 4.394* 3.534* 10.59***
(0.710) (4.105) (6.285) (2.233) (2.090) (3.763)
IV First-stage F-stat 268.81 268.81 403.17 223.01 223.01 223.01
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,702 3,702 3,182 2,912 2,912 2,912
Note: Analysis is conducted at the 4-digit state-industry-year level. We use Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
to measure formal employment and the NSSO’s unorganized sector surveys to measure informal employment.
We use surveys conducted in 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. In the IV specifications, Chinese imports to India is in-
strumented with Chinese imports into a set of 10 Latin American countries. Alternative trade channels include
output and input tariffs, access to Chinese inputs, import penetration from high income countries and low and
middle income countries separately, Chinese import share in high income countries, Chinese import share in low
and middle income countries, and India’s export share in the total exports to the set of Latin American countries
used to create the instrument. Regressions are weighted by total employment (column 1 and 2), informal em-
ployment (column 3), and formal employment (columns 4, 5, and 6) in the state-industry in the year 2000-2001.
Robust standard errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level in parentheses. ***, **, * is statistical significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 4: Chinese Import Competition and Formal Sector Employment:
Worker Level Analysis
Indicator for Employment in Formal Enterprise
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.522*** 0.538*** 0.512*** 0.466**
(0.168) (0.151) (0.163) (0.196) (0.178) (0.190)
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
First-stage F-statistic - - - 774.13 776.81 802.64
Worker Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Worker Characteristics × Year=2004 No No Yes No No Yes
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,017 36,017 36,010 36,017 36,017 36,010
Note: The NSSO employment-unemployment survey for the years 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 are used for analysis.
Worker characteristics include age and its squared, marital status indicator, female indicator, education status, ru-
ral residence indicator, religious minority status indicator, and disadvantaged social category indicator. In the IV
specifications, Chinese imports to India is instrumented with Chinese imports into a set of 10 Latin American coun-
tries. Alternative trade channels include output and input tariffs, access to Chinese inputs, import penetration from
high income countries and low and middle income countries separately, Chinese import share in high income coun-
tries, Chinese import share in low and middle income countries, and India’s export share in the total exports to the
set of Latin American countries used to create the instrument. All regressions are weighted using sample weights
from the NSSO employment-unemployment survey. Robust standard errors clustered at the 4-digit industry level in








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Chinese Import Competition and Employment: Heterogeneity based
on initial Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
Log Log Log Contract
Total Regular Contract worker
workers workers workers ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) -0.0609 0.0514 -0.127 -0.0363
(0.0975) (0.108) (0.104) (0.0271)
IMP × Qr2 0.122 -0.0407 0.269** 0.0531*
(0.104) (0.112) (0.133) (0.0295)
IMP × Qr3 0.390** 0.0469 0.577*** 0.124**
(0.171) (0.201) (0.198) (0.0512)
IMP × Qr4 0.492*** 0.105 0.505** 0.118***
(0.158) (0.128) (0.222) (0.0369)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
First-stage F-stat (IMP ) 75.05 73.92 74.88 73.57
First-stage F-stat (IMP ×Qr2) 42.66 41.12 39.66 41.74
First-stage F-stat (IMP ×Qr3) 52.42 47.15 42.14 38.32
First-stage F-stat (IMP ×Qr4) 33.09 32.79 33.27 33.26
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes
Factory FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit Industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 196,956 196,956 196,956 196,956
Note: Analysis uses the ASI data (formal sector firms) at the establishment level for the years
1998-1999 to 2007-2008. Qri is an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if a firm belongs to the
ith quartile of the productivity distribution (total) when it first enters our sample. We calculate
TFP using the methodology of Ackerberg et al. (2015). To obtain values in real terms, we use
output and input deflators from Allcott et al. (2016) and capital deflators from Reserve Bank of
India (RBI) publications. Chinese imports to India, and its interaction with the quartile indica-
tor variables are instrumented with Chinese imports into a set of 10 Latin American countries
and their corresponding interaction with quartiles. Alternative trade channels include output and
input tariffs, access to Chinese inputs, import penetration from high income countries and low
and middle income countries separately, Chinese import share in high income countries, Chinese
import share in low and middle income countries, and India’s export share in the total exports to
the set of Latin American countries used to create the instrument. All regressions are weighted
by the sample weights in the ASI survey. Robust standard errors clustered at the 4-digit indus-
try level in parentheses; *** - statistical significance at 1%; **- statistical significance at 5%; *-
statistical significance at 10%.
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A. Unadjusted 10.95 3.12
B. Adjusted for:
(1) Hours Worked 5.09 1.45
(2)= (1)+Human Capital Differences 3.77 1.07
(3) = (2)+Differences in Prices 2.18 -
(4)= (3)+Measurement Error in Revenue 1.53 -
(5)= (4)+Difference in Output Elasticity 1.24 -
Productivity Gains(%):
Using Estimates in (2) 5.13 0.3
Using Estimates in (3) 3.19
Using Estimates in (5) 0.89
Note: Column 1 reports the labor productivity gap between formal and informal enter-
prises, where labor productivity is measured by average revenue per worker. Column 2
reports the labor productivity gap between formal and informal enterprises, where labor
productivity is measured by earnings per worker. These calculations use data from the
Annual Survey of Industries for the formal sector, and data from the NSSO’s unorganized
enterprises survey for the informal sector for the years 2000-2001 and 2005-2006.
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Appendix A




αjs · IMPChinast (10)
where αjs is the share of input s in the total output for industry j, and IMP
China
st is the import
penetration ratio for input s. To obtain a measure of imported inputs from China in each industry,
we used the input-output (IO) mapping table for India for the year 1993-94 (Ministry of Statistics
and Programme Implementation, 2000). Input s in equation (10) refers to a sector in this IO table.
This input-output table is an n × n matrix of IO sectors. For each IO sector s in each row, the
columns give the share of other IO sectors which are used as inputs, which are represented by
αjs in equation (10). Using IMP
China
jt for industry j from (1), we use a simple mapping between
industries (j) and the IO sectors (s), to obtain a measure of IMPChinast for each IO sector s.
This then feeds into equation (10). We also instrument for access to imported inputs from China,




αjs · IV Chinast (11)
where the instrument is the weighted average of the instrument for import penetration ratio
calculated for the input sector s similar to (5) above. IV Chinast is the instrumental variable for
import penetration ratio defined in equation 2.
We proxy for Chinese import competition in foreign markets by Chinese import share in these









jt are Chinese import share in the foreign market, imports
from China to the foreign market, and total imports to the foreign markets in industry j and time
t respectively. Foreign market, F , is either the set of low and middle income economies except
China or the set of high income countries.
We compute the import penetration from other countries into India using equation (1), where
we replace Chinese imports with imports from the set of low and middle income countries or the
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high income countries. Finally, we use Indian exports to the set of IV countries as a share of total









Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 1.346*** 1.346**
(0.283) (0.662)
IV First-stage F-stat 259.24 248.05
Cluster at NIC3 Industry Yes No
Control for Dereservation No Yes
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 3,702 3,702
Note: Analysis is conducted at the 4-digit state-industry-
year level. We use Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to mea-
sure formal employment and the NSSO’s unorganized sector
surveys to measure informal employment. We use surveys
conducted in 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. In the IV specifica-
tions, Chinese imports to India is instrumented with Chinese
imports into a set of 10 Latin American countries. Alterna-
tive trade channels include output and input tariffs, access to
Chinese inputs, import penetration from high income coun-
tries and low and middle income countries separately, Chi-
nese import share in high income countries, Chinese import
share in low and middle income countries, and India’s export
share in the total exports to the set of Latin American coun-
tries used to create the instrument. Regressions are weighted
by total employment in the state-industry in the year 2000-
2001. Robust standard errors clustered at the 4-digit indus-
try level in parentheses. ***, **, * is statistical significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table B2: Chinese Import Competition, Employment, and Employment Shares
: Industry Level Analysis
Share in Log Employment
total employment Total Informal Formal
Formal Total Regular Contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 3.074*** –4.839 –13.34** 3.858* 2.201 8.091***
(0.741) (3.781) (5.183) (2.056) (1.889) (2.948)
Panel B: IV
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 3.174*** –5.086 –13.94** 3.955 2.252 8.183**
(0.757) (4.076) (5.463) (2.410) (2.042) (3.885)
First-stage F-stat 177.42 177.42 259.12 144.97 144.97 144.97
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 110 110 110 110 110 110
Note: Analysis is conducted at the 4-digit industry-year level. We use Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to mea-
sure formal employment, and the NSSO’s unorganized sector surveys to measure informal employment. We use
surveys conducted in 2000-2001 and 2005-2006. Chinese imports to India is instrumented with Chinese imports
into a set of 10 Latin American countries. Alternative trade channels include output and input tariffs, access to
Chinese inputs, import penetration from high income countries and low and middle income countries separately,
Chinese import share in high income countries, Chinese import share in low and middle income countries, and
India’s export share in the total exports to the set of Latin American countries used to create the instrument.
All regressions are weighted by the industry employment in the year 2000-2001. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the 4-digit industry level in parentheses; *** - statistical significance at 1%; **- statistical significance
at 5%; *- statistical significance at 10%.
48
Table B3: Chinese Import Competition and Reallocation of Output
log(Number of Factories) log(Sales)
Informal Formal Informal Formal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) -14.59** 3.974** -12.97* -0.118
(7.087) (1.693) (6.619) (1.796)
IV First-stage F-stat 427.07 223 408.34 222.97
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,766 2,894 2,596 2,880
Note: Analysis is conducted at the 4-digit state-industry-year level. We use Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI) to measure formal employment and the NSSO’s unorganized
sector surveys to measure informal employment. We use surveys conducted in 2000-2001
and 2005-2006. In the IV specifications, Chinese imports to India is instrumented with
Chinese imports into a set of 10 Latin American countries. Alternative trade channels
include output and input tariffs, access to Chinese inputs, import penetration from high
income countries and low and middle income countries separately, Chinese import share
in high income countries, Chinese import share in low and middle income countries, and
India’s export share in the total exports to the set of Latin American countries used
to create the instrument. Regressions are weighted by total employment in the state-
industry in the year 2000-2001. Robust standard errors clustered at the 4-digit industry
level in parentheses. ***, **, * is statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table B4: Chinese Import Competition and Employment: District Level
Log(Employment)
Overall Manufacturing Services Agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) –11.92 –39.73** –13.95 11.05
(18.14) (19.24) (20.04) (23.41)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
First-stage F-stat - - - -
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 932 924 896 930
Note: The NSSO employment-unemployment survey for the years 1999-2000 and 2004-2005
are used for analysis. Chinese imports to India is instrumented with Chinese imports into a
set of 10 Latin American countries. Alternative trade channels include import penetration
from high income countries and low and middle income countries separately. All regressions
are weighted by the initial employment share of the district in overall employment. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level in parentheses; *** - statistical significance at
1%; **- statistical significance at 5%; *- statistical significance at 10%.
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Table B5: Chinese Import Competition and Formal Sector Employment:
Worker Level Analysis, Robustness Checks
Indicator for Employment in Formal Enterprise
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Chinese Import Competition (IMP) 0.464*** 0.466** 0.466** 0.395**
(0.170) (0.190) (0.190) (0.196)
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV
Cluster at NIC3 Industry Yes No No No
Control for Dereservation No Yes No No
Worker Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Worker Characteristics × Year=2004 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alternative Trade Channels Yes Yes Yes Yes
3-digit-industry × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,010 36,010 36,010 35,583
Note: The NSSO employment-unemployment survey for the years 1999-2000 and 2004-2005 are
used for analysis. Worker characteristics include age and its squared, marital status indicator, fe-
male indicator, education status, rural residence indicator, religious minority status indicator, and
disadvantaged social category indicator. In the IV specifications, Chinese imports to India is in-
strumented with Chinese imports into a set of 10 Latin American countries. Alternative trade
channels include output and input tariffs, access to Chinese inputs, import penetration from high
income countries and low and middle income countries separately, Chinese import share in high
income countries, Chinese import share in low and middle income countries, and India’s export
share in the total exports to the set of Latin American countries used to create the instrument.
Column 3 defines informal workers using the size threshold in the Factories Act, 1948. Column 4
drops all observations where workers report working for a firm that is an informal firm based on
the size thresholds in the Factories Act but are registered firms. All regressions are weighted using
sample weights from the NSSO employment-unemployment survey. Robust standard errors clus-
tered at the 4-digit industry level in parentheses; *** - statistical significance at 1%; **- statistical












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C: Labor Productivity Gap
C0.1 Calculation of Unadjusted Productivity Gap
Using Equation 8 in the main text, we calculate labor productivity gap using both revenue per worker
as well as wages using data from the ASI-NSS firm level surveys. For calculating revenue per worker,
we aggregate revenue and employment for all firms in each sector and take the ratio. The productivity
gap is then given by the ratio of labor productivity between the formal and informal sector. We perform
similar calculations to get the wage gap. We sum up the total compensation paid to employees as well
the number of employees for each sector and take the ratio to arrive at the average wage per worker
in a sector. We take the ratio of the average wage for the formal and informal sector to get the wage
gap across the two sectors.
C0.2 Adjusting for Differences in Hours Worked
A major concern with the observed labor productivity gap is that it may be driven by differences in
average number of hours worked across the two sectors. If informal workers on average work fewer
hours we would overestimate the labor productivity gap. To make progress on this issue, we indirectly
infer the total number of hours worked for workers in each sector. For the informal sector, we utilize
availability of information on average number of hours worked per day and the number of months in
operation for the enterprise. However this information is only available for the 2005 round of the NSS
survey which forces us to use the ASI-NSS 2005 round to measure differences in hours worked across
the two sectors. We assume that the average number of hours worked across the two sectors does not
change significantly across the two sectors between the two rounds. Indeed, in the case of Vietnam,
McCaig and Pavcnik (2018) find that average number of hours worked do not vary much across two
separate surveys of the informal and formal sector firms.
We calculate the total number of hours worked by all employees for each firm as:
Hi = 30 × n× hi
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where n is number of months in operation, and hi is average number of hours worked as reported by
the firm. For the formal sector, we utilize data on number of mandays for each firm. We calculate
the total number of hours worked for the formal sector firm as Hf = 8×mandays, assuming a 8 hour
working shift for the formal firms. We sum Hi and Hf for all firms to arrive at the total number of
hours worked for the informal and formal sector, respectively. Next, we adjust the raw productivity
and wage gap by comparing the ratio of employees to the ratio of hours worked across the two sectors.
Our estimates provide an adjustment factor of 2.15 suggesting that differences in hours worked account
for a significant portion of the large unadjusted productivity gap.
C0.3 Adjusting for Difference in Human Capital
There may be significant differences in the human capital for workers in the two sectors that may
lead to overestimation of the productivity gap. To account for this heterogeneity, we follow Gollin
et al. (2014), who adjust for differences in average years of education across the agriculture and non-
agriculture sectors, and compute average human capital in a sector as ereds where r is the rate of
return on each year of education and eds is the average years of education in each sector s. The EUS
worker level survey provides details about the education level of each worker but does not report the
years of education. We infer the years of education for each worker based on the level of education
qualification using the standard number of years required to complete that level of education in the
Indian education system. We assign 5 years to primary education, 8 years to middle, 10 years to
secondary, 12 years to higher secondary, and 15 years to undergraduate and above. We assume a rate
of return of 10% for each year of education following Gollin et al. (2014). Using the above approach,
we estimate that the average human capital in formal sector is 1.35 times that in the informal sector.
C0.4 Adjusting for Difference in Prices
The labor productivity gap, as measured by revenue per unit labor, may reflect the effect of differences
in demand shocks and markup in addition to the true labor productivity gap. The ASI-NSS data is
55
unique in that we observe sales and quantity produced for all products (upto 10 products) produced
by each firm. We restrict our sample to firms that produce 10 or fewer products. These surveys assign
each product produced by the firm to a 5 digit ASICC product code. Our approach for correcting
for price differences involves comparing average prices across the two sectors. We start by calculating
the firm level prices (unit values) by dividing the firm product sales by quantity produced. Then
we calculate the firm level prices as the sales share weighted sum of firm product level prices. Next,
we calculate the real sales of a firm as the nominal sales deflated by the firm level prices calculated
above. We compare the real sales per worker gap between the formal and informal sectors to the
nominal sales per worker gap to arrive at a correction factor of 1.73. We adjust the labor productivity
gap by this factor and report the adjusted gap in row (3) of Table 8. The labor productivity gap
in column 1 drops from 3.77 to 2.18 due to this adjustment, suggesting that there are significant
differences in average firm level prices across the two sectors. Ignoring these price differences would
greatly overestimate the labor productivity gap between the two sectors.
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